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A NEW APPROACH TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY
By ANTONIo R. ROMASANTA*
Introduction
You are counsel for a defendant whom you feel was unjustly convicted
of second degree murder on an indictment for first degree murder. The de-
fendant maintains his innocence and now turns to you for advice regarding
a possible new trial. If an appeal were successful and a new trial granted,
would your client have the plea of former jeopardy in respect to the first
degree murder charge of which he was not convicted; or would the reversal
of the second degree conviction subject him to trial of all the issues as if
there never had been a trial? Diverse solutions are available with respect
to your problem influenced by the mere imaginary lines separating juris-
dictions.
The concept of former jeopardy can be traced to the common law where
the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convicti were used in criminal
law.' Blackstone commenting on these pleas stated:
2
Such a plea is grounded on the universal maxim of the common law of Eng-
land, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once
for the same offense.
The same ideals are found embodied in the fifth amendment of the United
States Constitution:
... nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb.
The California Constitution3 and constitutions of many states contain simi-
lar provisions.4 Different phrases are used in the various state constitutions
to describe the prohibition against double jeopardy,5 but they all are in
substance identical to the double jeopardy clause of the United States Con-
stitution. As will be pointed out later, though the language is substantially
identical and the principle well understood, the practical application of the
double jeopardy doctrine in identical fact situations varies as night and day
in diverse jurisdictions.
Nature of the Former Jeopardy Doctrine
The bases underlying the theory of the double jeopardy doctrine are
fair play and expediency.6 Generally, the defendant is "in jeopardy" when
* Member, Second-Year Class.
'Vaux's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 44a, 49a (1785).
2 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES § 336.
8 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
4 Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee,
Texas, Washington.
6 Former jeopardy, double jeopardy, twice in jeopardy, jeopardy of life or limb, jeopardy
for the same offense. See Bizzell v. State, 71 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1954) ; State v. Findling, 123 Minn.
413, 144 N.W. 142 (1913) ; Stout v. State ex rel. Caldwell, 360 Okla. 144, 130 Pac. 553 (1913).
6 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
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a valid information or indictment has been brought in a court of competent
jurisdiction, and a jury impaneled and sworn to try the case and to give a
verdict.7 At this point the state can no longer arbitrarily withdraw the case
from consideration by the jury over the defendant's objection.' Other-
wise, the state could withdraw when it felt the jury would acquit him,
hoping for better luck with a new jury. Withdrawal of the case from the
jury or from before a court without a jury has the legal effect of an acquit-
tal.' The same issues between the same parties could be tried time and again
unless some technique was used to bring about a final determination of the
case.
Under certain circumstances, however, notable procedural exceptions
exist with respect to the rule of prohibiting a new trial of the same issues
once the defendant has been in jeopardy and the jury dismissed without
rendering a verdict. "Evident necessity" justified in the interest of public
justice permits the discharge of the jury in cases where illness or death
of the defendant"0 or juror," impossibility of jurors agreeing on a verdict,'
or consent of the defendant 3 renders a verdict impossible.' 4 If the above
exceptions were not recognized and the double jeopardy prohibition were
followed blindly, the administration of justice would become exceedingly
difficult. For example, if in the course of a trial several of the jurors be-
come too ill to continue, the defendant would still be subject to a new trial.
To hold that a discharge of the jury without rendering a verdict has the
legal effect of acquitting the defendant under all circumstances would have
more evil consequences than those which the double jeopardy prohibition
is designed to prevent.
Waiver by Appeal
Does a defendant waive his constitutional right not to be placed in
double jeopardy for the higher offense of which he was not convicted by
procuring reversal of a conviction of a lower offense? When the jury brings
7 People v. Tibbits, 60 Cal. App. 2d 335, 140 P.2d 126 (1943); State v. Yokum, 155 La.
846, 99 So. 621 (1924) ; Ex Parte Kirk, 96 Okla. Cr. 272, 252 P.2d 1032 (1943) ; Holt v. State
24 S.W.2d 886 (Tenn. 1930); State v. White, 243 Wis. 423, 10 N.W.2d 117 (1943).
8 Jackson v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 2d 350, 74 P.2d 243 (1937); People v. Brown, 273 I1.
169, 112 N.E. 462 (1916); State v. Madden, 119 Kan. 263, 237 Pac. 663 (1925); Wilson v.
Commonwealth, 212 Ky. 584, 279 S.W. 988 (1926); State v. Mason, 326 Mo. 973, 33 S.W.2d 895
(1930).
9 People v. Garcia, 120 Cal. App. Supp. 767, 7 P.2d 401 (1931) ; Hall v. State, 134 A. 692,
3 W.W. Harr. 233 (DeL 1926); State v. Pittsburg Paving Brick Co., 117 Kan. 192, 23 Pac. 1035
(1924).
10 People ex rel. Jimerson v. Freiberg, 137 Misc. 314, 243 N.Y.S. 590 (1930).
11 State v. Kappen, 191 Iowa 19, 180 N.W. 307 (1920).
12 Alford v. State, 243 Ala. 404, 10 So.2d 373 (1942) ; People v. Sullivan, 101 Cal. App. 2d
322, 225 P.2d 645 (1950) ; State ex rel. Williams v. Grayson, 90 So.2d 710 (Fla. 1956) ; People
v. De Frates, 395 Ill. 439, 70 N.E.2d 591 (1946).
13 United States v. Harriman, 130 F. Supp. 198 (D.C.N.Y. 1955) ; Lee v. State, 31 Ala.
App. 91, 13 So.2d 583 (1943); People v. Mills, 148 Cal. App. 2d 392, 306 P.2d 1005 (1957);
People v. Dodson, 107 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1951).
141n re Scrafford, 21 Kan. 735 (1879); State v. Malouf, 199 Tenn. 496, 287 S.W.2d 79
(1956).
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in a verdict of guilty to the lower offense what can be said about their find-
ing as to the higher offense? To say that the jury's verdict was silent as to
the higher offense and thus there is no finding as to the higher offense, or
that there was an implied acquittal, or that it was in fact an acquittal, is to
make a distinction without significance as far as the original trial is con-
cerned. The defendant simply cannot be punished for the higher offense
because he has not been convicted of it. From this conclusion it follows
that the conviction of the lower offense on an indictment for the higher
has the legal consequence of an acquittal of the higher. 5
The problem now is whether the defendant waives his constitutional
right against being placed in double jeopardy on the higher crime of which
he was not convicted when he seeks reversal of the lower offense. If there
has been no appeal or the appeal was unsuccessful, a plea of former jeop-
ardy is an absolute bar to a new trial.
In an early case, the Supreme Court of Nevada held:"
... that when the defendant is convicted, and he asks for a second trial to
relieve himself of the jeopardy in which he finds himself by reason of his
conviction and judgment, and his prayer is granted, he is estopped from
asserting a formal acquittal on his second trial, and waives his constitu-
tional right of pleading once in jeopardy, or that his right has been in any
way infringed, because by his own voluntary consent, act, and petition he
has been relieved of the bar which prevents him interposing this plea.
On the other hand, Justice Holmes, in an excellent analysis of the double
jeopardy controversy points out in his dissenting opinion in Kepner v.
United States:1
Usually no waiver is expressed or thought of. Moreover it cannot be im-
agined that the law would deny to a prisoner the correction of a fatal error,
unless he should waive other rights.
If waiver is to be defined as voluntary relinquishment of a right, clearly
a defendant only intends to waive his right as to the lower offense. The
defendant's request for correction of error extends only to the conviction
of the lower offense.
Several states 8 have statutes defining the extent and effect of granting
a new trial similar to the California Penal Code, which provides:' 9
The granting of a new trial places the parties in the same position as if no
trial had been had. All the testimony must be produced anew, and the
former verdict or finding cannot be used or referred to, either in evidence
or in argument, or pleaded in bar of any conviction which might have been
under the accusatory pleading.
15 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1938).
16In re Somers, 31 Nev. 531, 536, 103 Pac. 1073, 1075 (1909).
17 195 U.S. 100 (1904) (dissenting opinion).
1 8 Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma and Utah.
19 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1180.
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California cases have interpreted this section to apply only to the unsettled
issues,2° that is, the lesser crime which a defendant is appealing. To hold
that a defendant voluntarily waives his rights by proceeding with an appeal
when the procedural consequences are known is clearly a forced construc-
tion of voluntary waiver. This would be relinquishment by operation of law
and not by voluntary act of the defendant. When presented with the waiver
argument the Supreme Court of the United States in the recent case of
Green v. United States stated: 1
Reduced to plain terms, the Government contends that in order to secure
the reversal of an erroneous conviction of one offense, a defendant must
surrender his valid defense of former jeopardy not only on that offense but
also on a different offense for which he was not convicted and which was not
involved in his appeal .... As the Court of Appeals said in its first opinion
in this case, a defendant faced with such a "choice" takes a "desperate
chance" in securing the reversal of the erroneous conviction. The law should
not, and in our judgment does not, place the defendant in such an incred-
ible dilemma.
Admittedly all the states have the sovereign power to prescribe condi-
tions on criminal appeals. But this right might not justify the imposition
of such extreme conditions as forfeiture of the plea of once in jeopardy on
a defendant who must be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt in a fair trial. The position that a defendant voluntarily
waives this right is a conclusion which is difficult to support.
Effect of Reversal of Lesser Crime
In Jones v. State22 the defendant was indicted for murder and convicted
of manslaughter. The conviction was reversed on appeal. In the second
trial the defendant was convicted of murder. The defendant claimed the
decision was in violation of his constitutional right not to be placed in
double jeopardy. The Mississippi Supreme Court held:
If a verdict of manslaughter impliedly acquits the defendant of murder, it
also impliedly adjudges that he is not innocent. One implication flows as
necessarily and readily from the conviction of manslaughter as the other.
To hold that an appellant can appeal and set aside a judgment of conviction
upon which it is entered, and upon which no other judgment could be
entered, is to leave the shadow without the substance; to leave the implied
and remove the actual thing upon which the implication is based. If the
verdict convicting of manslaughter is destroyed, it is difficult for the reason-
ing mind to see how any implied verdict of judgment can exist.
20 People v. Gordon, 99 Cal. 227, 33 Pac. 901 (1893) ; People v. Krupa, 64 Cal. App. 2d 592,
149 P.2d 416 (1944).
21355 U.S. at 193.
2 144 Miss. 52, 109 So. 265 (1926).
2 3 Id. at 72, 109 So. at 269.
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The same view was reflected in a decision by the Supreme Court of South
Carolina24 in which a defendant was indicted for murder and convicted of
manslaughter. The verdict was reversed on appeal. The defendant was re-
tried and convicted of murder. The second trial was held not in violation
of the state's constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy. In the
course of the opinion the court said:"
It is undoubtedly true that the legal effect of the verdict of manslaughter
on an indictment of murder is to acquit of the greater offense. This implica-
tion or inference, however, rests upon the existence of the verdict of man-
slaughter as the result of a trial upon the indictment for murder. Remove
the fact upon which the inference is based and necessarily the inference
goes with it.
It is difficult to yield to the force of this sophisticated reasoning. The
conclusions are not consistent with the facts. The conviction of man-
slaughter was unjustly obtained since it was reversed; thus if there be any
implication it must be a presumption of innocence in every respect. The
defendant was not convicted of murder and the conviction of manslaughter
was reversed.
The only question to be resolved, as far as the defendant is concerned,
is the erroneous conviction of manslaughter. The state, however, may con-
tend that the defendant should have been convicted of murder, the higher
offense.
It is the opinion of this writer that if an error occurred in the trial court
as to the higher offense it must be presumed in favor of the state. If this
were not so, on what other theory could the one-sided appeal generally
practiced in the United States be justified? The South Carolina court is
really offering a defendant a package deal. In order to obtain a review of
an unjust conviction the defendant must give up a just acquittal of the
higher offense. This would seem to be a narrow and grudging administra-
tion of precious rights. When safeguards which are susceptible of two inter-
pretations are enacted for the protection of man, the interpretation more in
consonance with the humane spirit of the day as well as our Anglo-American
jurisprudence should be adopted.
Former Jeopardy in California: The Gomez Case
In California, the rule on former jeopardy has been recently clarified.
Prior to the case of Gomez v. Superior Court,26 California occupied a unique
position in its solution of this problem by drawing a distinction between a
conviction of a lesser offense necessarily included in the charge of a greater
offense and conviction of a crime of a lower degree than that charged. In the
former situation, the conviction of the lesser included offense had the legal
2 4 State v. Gillis, 73 S.C. 318, 53 S.E. 487 (1906).
25 Id. at 323, 53 S.E. 489.
26 50 Cal. 2. ........ 328 P.2d 976 (1957).
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effect of an acquittal of the greater.17 In the latter, a conviction of a lower
degree of the crime did not operate as an acquittal of the higher degree."
Thus, if the defendant were indicted for murder and convicted of man-
slaughter, which is a lesser included offense, and the conviction was reversed
on appeal, the defendant could only stand trial for manslaughter. If the
conviction was second degree murder, the defendant could stand trial for
first degree murder on the grounds that his prior conviction was of murder;
the degree relating only to the fixing of punishment.
The distinction between the two cases seems to be that in crimes involv-
ing degrees the conviction is of the offense, the degree being only significant
in that it fixes the punishment. Thus, a reversal of the lower degree oper-
ates to set aside the entire verdict. While in the case of a reversal of an
offense which is included in an indictment for a greater offense, such as a
conviction of assault on an indictment of battery, the conviction of the
lesser included offense of assault is an acquittal of the greater offense of
battery. Reversal of the included offense does not disturb the acquittal of
the higher offense.
When an offense cannot be committed without necessarily committing
another offense, the latter is an included offense.29 Larceny is an included
offense of robbery because it is impossible to commit robbery without com-
mitting larceny. The necessity for making the above distinctions has been
eliminated by the Gomez case.
In the Gomez case, the defendants were accused of grand theft of a load-
ing shovel of the value of $3000.0 They appealed from the jury's verdict
of petty theft3' and obtained a reversal in the California District Court of
Appeals.32 The court then ordered them to proceed to trial on a charge of
grand theft in the superior court. The defendants alleged that the superior
court had no jurisdiction33 over the sole remaining charge of petty theft
since they had been once in jeopardy for grand theft and had been acquitted
of the charge. The California Supreme Court stated that since the Cali-
fornia courts in prior cases 4 had made no distinction between lesser in-
27 "A conviction for manslaughter is an acquittal of the charge of murder, and the verdict
though general in terms, must, by legal operation, amount to an acquittal of every higher
offense charged in the indictment than the particular one of which the defendant is found
guilty." People v. Gilmore, 4 Cal. 376 (1854).
2 8 People v. Keefer, 65 Cal. 232, 3 Pac. 818 (1884) (conviction of second degree murder at
former trial held not to be bar for subsequent trial of murder in first degree) ; In re Moore,
29 Cal. App. 2d 56, 84 P.2d 57 (1938) ; People v. McNeer, 14 Cal. App. 2d 22, 57 P.2d 1018
(1936).
2 9 See Note, 9 HAsTmGs LJ. 92 (1957).
30 See CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 484, 487, 487a, 488.
31 See CA.. PEN. CODE § 488.
82People v. Cardinal, 154 Cal. App. 2d 835, 316 P.2d 1001 (1957).
83 See CAL. PEN. CODE § 1425.
84 People v. Daniel, 65 Cal. App. 2d 622, 151 P.2d 846 (1944); People v. Slater, 60 Cal.
App. 2d 358, 140 P.2d 846 (1943) ; People v. Lynch, 60 Cal. App. 2d 133, 140 P.2d 418 (1943) ;
People v. Cowan, 38 Cal. App. 2d 231, 101 P.2d 125 (1940); People v. Castro, 37 Cal. App. 2d
311, 99 P.2d 374 (1940).
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cluded and crimes of a different degree when applying section 1181 of the
Penal Code, 5 there was no reason to draw a distinction insofar as the ques-
tion of double jeopardy is concerned." Under this code section it is not a
matter of material importance whether the crime was of a lesser degree or
a lesser included crime. In either case the trial court could modify the judg-
ment. However, the court quite correctly holds:3
... that no sound reason exists for the distinction drawn by the California
cases, and our constitutional provision and statutes certainly do not require
one to be drawn.
The real significance of the Gomez case is not only that the heretofore
illogical distinctions between crimes of a lesser degree and included crimes
has been obliterated but it applies a liberal interpretation to the double
jeopardy provision of the California Constitution. 8 The holding provides
that in the new trial the defendant's jeopardy extends only to the crime of
which he was previously convicted and a trial of the higher crime is barred. 9
By comparison a substantial number of the states hold that when the
defendant is found guilty of a lower offense than charged, and appeals from
the judgment, the legal effect of the reversal sets aside the entire trial of
conviction and leaves the defendant in the same position as if he had never
been tried.4" One of these states is New York where the Court of Appeals
held that where the defendant was indicted for first degree assault, con-
victed of third degree, from which he obtained a reversal and new trial:"'
.... [T] he effect of the defendant's appeal is merely to continue the indict-
ment in the appellate court, and, if reversal of the judgment of conviction
follows, that judgment, as well as the record of the former trial, has been
annulled and expunged by the judgment of the appellate court, and they
are though they never had been.
The court goes on further to say the defendant waives his constitutional
protection to be tried for the higher offense when he asks for a new trial.42
The California and New York cases reflect the two schools of thought
35 Providing "that if the evidence (in criminal causes) shows the defendant to be not
guilty of the degree of the crime of which he was convicted, but guilty oj a lesser degree thereof
or of a lesser crime included therein, the trial court may modify the judgment accordingly
without granting or ordering a new trial, and this power shall extend to any court to which
the cause may be appealed." (Emphasis added.)
36 50 Cal. 2d at ......... 328 P.2d at 981.
37 Id. at ......... 328 P.2d at 979.
38 Art. I, § 3.
39 50 Cal. 2d at ......... 328 P.2d at 985.
40 Nineteen are enumerated by Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion in the Green
case. They are: Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Caro-
lina, Utah, Vermont and Washington. 355 U.S. at 216-17 n.4 and cases there cited.
41 People v. Palmer, 109 N.Y. 413, 17 N.E. 213 (1888).
42 1d. at 420, 17 N.E. at 215.
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on the issue of whether a retrial for the greater offense is a violation of
the double jeopardy provisions of the state constitutions.
Position of the Federal Courts
In the recent case of Green v. United States, the Supreme Court of the
United States adopted the position held by seventeen states.4 3 Where a de-
fendant is convicted of a lesser crime than charged, but on appeal that con-
viction is reversed and a new trial ordered, a trial of the higher charge
would place the defendant in jeopardy twice for the same offense. In the
Green case the defendant was prosecuted for first degree murder and con-
victed of second degree murder. On appeal the conviction was reversed;
the defendant could not be tried again for first degree murder without vio-
lating the double jeopardy provisions of the fifth amendment of the United
States Constitution. Mr. Justice Clark, discussing the nature of the double
jeopardy doctrine, pointed out:44
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-
American system of jurisprudence, is that the state with all its resources
and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to the embarrass-
ment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state
of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent he may be found guilty.
The position taken by the Supreme Court in the Green case reflects both
these principles stated above by Justice Clark and the American ideal of
liberty that the welfare of the state yields to the interests of the individual.
Due Process and the Federal Construction of Double Jeopardy
Can it be said that the Supreme Court in the Green case has established
the minimum standard of fairness required by the fourteenth amendment
in regard to the states' application of the double jeopardy concept? The
importance of the Green case lies in the "persuasive" language45 that the
double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment as interpreted by the
Supreme Court may apply to the states as encompassed within the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment:
... nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.
Whether the constitutional provisions of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution have been vio-
lated requires the application of the slippery standard of minimum fair-
4 3 As listed by Justice Frankfurter, they are: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Delaware,
Florida, llinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin. In the other states the question had not been
considered up to the Green case. 355 U.S. at 217-18 n.4 and cases there cited.
44 355 U.S. at 187.
4 5 1d. at 198.
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ness.46 The court in the Green case expressly rejects the position taken in
Trono v. United States,4 7 stating: 48
We believe that if either of the rationales offered to support the Trono
result were adopted here it would unduly impair the constitutional prohi-
bition against double jeopardy. The right not to be placed in jeopardy more
than once for the same offense is a vital safeguard in our society, one that
was dearly won and one that should continue to be highly valued. If such
great constitutional protections are given a narrow, grudging application
they are deprived of much of their significance.
In the recent case of Hoag v. New Jersey, Justices Douglas and Black
stated in a dissenting opinion:
4 9
We recently stated in Green v. United States, that by virtue of the consti-
tution, protection against double jeopardy an accused can be forced "to run
the gauntlet" but once on a charge. That case, involving a federal prose-
cution, provides for me the standard for every state prosecution as well.
(Emphasis added.)
In construing the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment,
the Supreme Court of the United States has, in substance, said that it is
fundamentally unfair to try a defendant for the higher offense when he
procures a reversal of a conviction of a lower offense on an indictment for
the higher offense. The Supreme Court of the United States has unequivo-
cally stated that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does
not encompass all the rights of the Federal Bill of Rights.5" In other words,
a violation of the fifth amendment which applies to the federal courts does
not necessarily violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
which applies to the state courts. The court did not hold that this decision
would be binding on the states, but this was not a question before it.
It is the opinion of this writer that the court was thinking of the four-
teenth amendment and did, in essence, say that any other procedure in
regard to double jeopardy would be fundamentally unfair. It would be dif-
ficult for a reasoning mind to accept a position that what is fundamentally
unfair in a federal court by some act of magic becomes fundamentally fair
in a state court. The Supreme Court said:51
The right not to be placed in jeopardy more than once for the same offense
is a vital safeguard in our society, one that was dearly won and one that
should continue to be highly valued.
46 Id. at 215 (dissenting opinion by justice Frankfurter).
47 199 U.S. 521 (1905). This was a murder prosecution where the defendants were found
guilty of assault. On appeal the conviction was reversed. It was held that the defendants could
be tried again for murder on the grounds that they waived their plea of former jeopardy with
regard to the charge of murder by appealing the conviction of assault.
48 355 U.S. at 198.
49 356 U.S. 464, 477 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
50 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53 (1947).
51355 U.S. at 198.
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Presumably, "our society" was not meant to be restricted to a federal soci-
ety or that "this highly valued and dearly won right" was intended to be
available only to those who found themselves in federal courts. In other
words, it would seem that if a particular procedure is fundamentally unfair
with reference to the fifth amendment, the same procedure would be funda-
mentally unfair in a state court and consequently a violation of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Conclusion
Your client, in order to secure the reversal of an erroneous conviction
of second degree murder must take the chance of conviction of first degree
murder which may be punishable by death. Unless he has the spirit of
Patrick Henry, who achieved fame by saying, "Give me liberty, or give me
death," he may find it wise to be content with the second degree conviction.
The difference in punishment between first degree murder and second de-
gree murder can be as different as night and day.52
You, as a counselor advising your client, will have to consider the chance
of possible conviction for the higher offense where the rule in the Green or
Gomez cases does not prevail. But the chance does not seem as "desperate"
with the Green case appearing on the horizon.
52 CAL. PEN. CODE § 190-Punishment for murder:
"Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death, or confinement
in the State prison for life, at the discretion of the jury trying the same; or upon the
plea of guilty, the court shall determine the same; and every person guilty of murder
in the second degree is punishable by imprisonment in the State prison from five years
to life."
CAL. PEN-. CODE § 2920 (minimum confinement, second degree murder, with good time
allowances-3 years, 7 months).
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